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ABSTRACT
Hidden Markov model (HMM) has been well studied and
extensively used. In this paper, we present DPHMM (Differ-
entially Private Hidden Markov Model), an HMM embedded
with a private data release mechanism, in which the privacy
of the data is protected through a graph. Specifically, we
treat every state in Markov model as a node, and use a graph
to represent the privacy policy, in which “indistinguishabil-
ity” between states is denoted by edges between nodes. Due
to the temporal correlations in Markov model, we show that
the graph may be reduced to a subgraph with disconnected
nodes, which become unprotected and might be exposed.
To detect such privacy risk, we define sensitivity hull and
degree of protection based on the graph to capture the con-
dition of information exposure. Then to tackle the detected
exposure, we study how to build an optimal graph based
on the existing graph. We also implement and evaluate the
DPHMM on real-world datasets, showing that privacy and
utility can be better tuned with customized policy graph.
1. INTRODUCTION
As information is widely shared and frequently exchanged
in the big-data era, data-owners’ fear of privacy breach con-
tinues to escalate. For instance, 78% smartphone users among
180 participants in a survey [11] believe that apps accessing
their location pose privacy threats. On the other hand, data
collected from individual users can be of great value for both
academic research and society, e.g. for purposes like data
mining or social studies. To release such data, private infor-
mation must be retained. As a result, private data release
has drawn increasing research interest.
Markov model has been extensively used as a standard
data model. For example, to analyze the web navigation
behavior of users, the transitions between web-pages can be
described through Markov model [5]; to analyze the moving
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Figure 1: Private data release mechanism embedded in HMM
patterns of users, Markov model (e.g., in Figure 3a a user
moves among 6 locations) is also commonly adopted [25, 12].
To preserve the privacy in Markov model, the true state (e.g.
the true webpage the user is browsing or the true location
of a moving user) must be protected before the data is used
or released.
In this paper, we study the problem of private data re-
lease in Markov model. First, the true state that changes by
Markov transition should be hidden from (not observable to)
adversaries. Hence it is an HMM. Second, different from the
traditional HMM where the emission probabilities governing
the distribution of the observed variables are given, we em-
bed a private data release mechanism in HMM to determine
the emission probabilities for privacy protection. Given a
function of the state, our goal is to release the answer of the
function with the private data release mechanism at each
timestamp. Figure 1 shows our problem.
To design the private data release mechanism, there are
two major difficulties.
• How to tune the trade-off between privacy and utility
with customizable privacy policy? Most privacy no-
tions in the literature only work in their specific prob-
lem settings, and lack the flexibility of trading-off pri-
vacy and utility. The state-of-art Blowfish framework
[16], however, was proposed in the statistical database
context, and cannot be directly adopted in Markov
model.
• How to design a privacy notion under the temporal
correlations in Markov model? Because most privacy
notions proposed so far only focus on privacy models in
static scenarios, they are vulnerable against inference
attacks with temporal correlations in Markov model.
Next we explain the above difficulties in details. We first
briefly introduce Blowfish framework. Then we show how
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Figure 2: (a): a table showing patients’ diseases with each row
being a secret; (b): a policy graph of bounded Blowfish; (c): a
policy graph of unbounded Blowfish.
several challenges emerge when adapting Blowfish frame-
work in Markov model.
Blowfish Privacy. Customizable privacy framework, Blow-
fish privacy [16, 19], has been studied in statistical database
context. To tune the privacy and utility, it uses a policy
graph where a node represents a secret, and an edge repre-
sents indistinguishability between the two connected nodes.
For example, Figure 2a is a patients’ table where each row is
a secret indicating the patient’s disease e.g., secrets s3 and
s4 are “Bob has cancer” and “Bob has diabetes” respectively.
For bounded Blowfish privacy, it uses a policy graph to en-
force the indistinguishability between the secrets, which can
be regarded as edge protection in the graph. For instance,
Figure 2b ensures adversaries cannot distinguish whether
Bob has cancer or diabetes by connecting s3 and s4. For
unbounded Blowfish privacy, it uses a policy graph to dis-
guise the existence of secrets. For example, Figure 2c con-
nects all secrets to a “null” node, which represents the non-
existence of these nodes. Thus the adversaries cannot know
whether a secret is real or not. Furthermore, the bounded
and unbounded Blowfish privacies can also be combined in
one graph by adding the null node into the graph of bounded
Blowfish.
Although the privacy customization of Blowfish is intu-
itive, the overall protection of Blowfish, which can be prob-
lematic in the following examples, has not been fully studied.
• Are secrets s5 and s6 also protected in Figure 2b?
Since they are disconnected in the graph, for their pro-
tections, is it necessary to connect them to a null node,
or connect them to other nodes (and which)?
• If {,G}-Blowfish privacy is preserved where G is the
graph in Figure 2b, what is the privacy guarantee for
all the secrets {s1 ∼ s6}, i.e., how to quantify Blowfish
privacy in terms of differential privacy?
We will answer above questions in Example 5.3, followed
with theoretical result.
Markov Model. Markov model has been studied with dif-
ferential privacy in existing works. Chatzikokolakis et al.
[2] and Fan et al. [10] used Markov model for improving
utility of released location traces or web browsing activities,
but did not consider the inference risks under the temporal
correlations of the Markov model. Xiao et al. [27] studied
how to protect a user’s location, described through Markov
model, in a set of possible locations (states) where the user
might appear. However, such set of possible states could be
either too big or too small for the user. In reality, the nature
of privacy is determined by personal information. Hence it
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Figure 3: Running example. (a): protecting a state in its cat-
egory (the octagon, circles or squares); (b): the policy graph
connecting all nodes in a category; (c): an adversary estimated
that the true location can only be {s2, s3, s5}; (d): the reduced
graph from (b) with the constraint in (c).
is necessary to customize privacy protection for personal de-
mands.
We can potentially apply Blowfish privacy in Markov model.
For example, Figure 3a shows the Markov model of a mov-
ing user with 6 states, denoted by {s1, · · · , s6}. If the user
prefers to hide her state in 3 categories, i.e., cafeteria, school
and grocery (the octagon, circle and square in Figure 3a),
the privacy customization can be achieved by the graph in
Figure 3b. Then if the user is at state s5, the graph ensures
that {s4, s5, s6} are indistinguishable.
Unfortunately, the policy graph may be reduced under
the temporal correlations in Markov model. For instance,
assume the user moved from s1 to s5. If an adversary in-
fers by temporal correlations that the true state can only be
{s2, s3, s5}, the shaded area in Figure 3c, is the graph in Fig-
ure 3b still applicable? In this case, although s5 is connected
to s4 and s6, the adversary can eliminate s4 and s6 with the
knowledge (constraint). In consequence, the original edges
s4s5 and s5s6 disappear, as shown in Figure 3d. Then the
following questions arise: is s5 still protected? If not, how to
re-generate a new graph to protect s5 based on the current
graph? We will answer these questions in Examples 5.1, 5.2
and 6.1.
Another challenge of directly applying Blowfish privacy is
the constraint type. In Blowfish framework, the constraints
are deterministic, which leads to the NP-hard complexity
[16]. Whereas the constraints in Markov model are proba-
bilistic. For example, in Blowfish framework, Bob can have
cancer and diabetes at the same time, or no disease at all.
However, in Markov model, there has to and can only exist
ONE state, which means the existence of one state excludes
all other states. Such rigid constraints pose higher privacy
risk than in Blowfish framework.
At last, the long-term privacy protection after releasing
a sequence of data should also be considered. For instance,
assume the user moved from s1 to s5, and the real sequence is
{s1, s2, s5}. If other possible sequences can also be estimated
by temporal correlations, like {s1, s4, s5}, {s1, s2, s3}, then
what is the long-term protection for the these sequences?
1.1 Contributions
First, we propose a rigorous and customizable DPHMM
notion by extending the Blowfish privacy [16]. Specifically,
we treat every state in Markov model as a node, and con-
struct a graph, in which edges represent “indistinguishabil-
ity” between the connecting nodes, to represent the privacy
policy. In this way, the DPHMM notion guarantees that the
true state is always protected in its connecting “neighbors”.
Second, we formally analyze the privacy risk under the
constraint of temporal correlations. We show that the orig-
inal graph may be reduced to a subgraph under the con-
straint, possibly with disconnected nodes. To detect the in-
formation leakage of the disconnected nodes, we define sen-
sitivity hull and degree of protection (DoP) based on the
graph to capture the protectability of a graph (if a graph
is not protectable, then the disconnected nodes will be ex-
posed). We also quantify the overall protection of Blowfish
privacy in terms of differential privacy using the sensitivity
hull. In addition, we prove that Laplace mechanism [7] is
a special case of K-norm mechanism [14], and provides no
better utility than K-norm mechanism.
Third, we develop a data release mechanism to achieve
DPHMM. To tackle the detected information leakage, we
study how to re-connect the disconnected nodes and find
the optimal protectable graph based on the existing graph.
We also implement and evaluate the data release mechanism
on real-world datasets, showing that privacy and utility can
be better tuned with customized policy graph.
Fourth, we thoroughly study the privacy guarantee of
DPHMM framework. Besides comparing DPHMM with other
privacy notions, we present the privacy composition results
when multiple queries were answered over multiple times-
tamps.
2. RELATED WORKS
2.1 Differential Privacy
While differential privacy [6] has been accepted as a stan-
dard notion for privacy protection, most works used Laplace
mechanism [7] to release differentially private data. Based
on Laplace mechanism, Li et al. proposed Matrix mecha-
nism [20] to answer a batch of queries by factorizing a query
matrix to generate a better “strategy” matrix that can re-
place the original query matrix. Other mechanisms, such as
Exponential mechanism [22] and K-Norm mechanism [14],
were also proposed to guarantee differential privacy. We
refer readers to [15] for a comparative study of the mecha-
nisms. A variety of differentially private applications [2, 10,
17] can also be found in literature.
Because the concept of standard differential privacy is not
generally applicable, several variants or generalizations of
differential privacy, such as induced neighbors privacy [18],
have been proposed. Among these variants, Blowfish pri-
vacy [16] is the first generic framework with customizable
privacy policy. It defines sensitive information as secrets
and known knowledge about the data as constraints. By
constructing a policy graph, which should also be consis-
tent with all constraints, Blowfish privacy can be formally
defined. We extend Blowfish framework to Markov model,
and quantify the overall protection of Blowfish privacy in
both database context and Markov model.
The lower bound of differentially private query-answering
was also investigated. Hardt and Talwar [14] proposed the
theoretical lower bound for any differentially private mech-
anisms. To achieve the lower bound, they also studied K-
Norm based algorithms to release differentially private data.
In the query answering setting, K-Norm mechanism is op-
timal only when the sensitivity hull [27] is in isotropic po-
sition. In this paper, we extend the K-Norm mechanism
by investigating the sensitivity hull K in the new setting of
DPHMM.
2.2 Private Sequential Data
To account for sequential data that changes over time,
progresses were made under the assumption that data at
different timestamps should be independent. Dwork et al.
[8] proposed“user-level”and“event-level”differential privacy
to answer count queries on binary bit data. The approach
is to use a binary tree technique to amortize Laplace noises
to a range of nodes in the tree. Thus the noise magnitude
becomes proportional to log(T ) where T is the time period.
The same result was also achieved in [1]. Kellaris et al. [17]
studied w-event privacy, which protects the continual events
in w consecutive timestamps by adjusting the allocation of
privacy budget. Overall, above works mainly focused on
releasing data independently at each timestamp regardless
of temporal correlations.
Temporal correlations were considered with Markov model
in several recent works. Several works considered Markov
models for improving utility of released location traces or
web browsing activities [2, 10], but did not consider the in-
ference risks when an adversary has the knowledge of the
Markov model. Xiao et al. [27] studied how to protect the
true location if a user’s movement follows Markov model.
The technique can be viewed as a special instantiation of
DPHMM for a two-dimensional query (see Theorem 4.1 for
details). In addition, DPHMM uses a policy graph to tune
the privacy and utility in Markov model.
3. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATE-
MENT
We denote scalar variables by normal letters, vectors by
bold lowercase letters, and matrices by bold capital letters.
Superscript xT is the transpose of a vector x; x[i] is the ith
element of x. Operators ∪ and ∩ denote union and inter-
section of sets; | · | denotes the number of elements in a set;
|| · ||p denotes `p norm; ab denotes a line connecting points
a and b. Table 1 summarizes some important symbols for
convenience.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy protects a database by ensuring that
neighboring databases generate similar output. W.l.o.g, we
use x ∈ Rn to denote a database with n tuples. A query
is a function f(x): x → Rd that maps x to Rd. We use z
to denote the answer of a query from a differentially private
mechanism.
S domain of states in Markov model
si, sj , sk a state in Markov model
s∗ the true state
z the released (observed) answer
p−t prior probability (vector) at timestamp t
p+t posterior probability (vector) at timestamp t
C constraint (set)
K sensitivity hull
Table 1: Notation
Definition 3.1 (Differential Privacy). A random-
ized mechanism A() satisfies -differential privacy if for any
output z, Pr(A(x1)=z)
Pr(A(x2)=z) ≤ e
 where neighboring databases x1
and x2 satisfies
• (Unbounded DP) x2 can be obtained from x1 by adding
or removing a tuple.
• (Bounded DP) x2 can be obtained from x1 by replacing
a tuple.
Laplace Mechanism. Laplace mechanism is commonly
used in literature. It is built on the `1-norm sensitivity [7],
defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (`1-norm Sensitivity). For any query
f(x): x→ Rd, its `1-norm sensitivity Sf is the maximum `1
norm of f(x1) − f(x2) where x1 and x2 are any two neigh-
boring databases.
Sf := max
x1,x2∈ neighboring databases
||f(x1)− f(x2)||1
where || · ||1 denotes the `1 norm.
A query can be answered by f(x) +Lap(Sf/) to achieve
-differential privacy, where Lap() ∈ Rd are i.i.d. random
noises drawn from Laplace distribution.
K-norm Mechanism. K-norm, written as || · ||K , is the
(Minkowski) norm defined by convex body K (i.e. ||v||K =
inf{r > 0 : v ∈ rK}). Given any query f , its sensitivity
hull K can be derived [27]. Then a differentially private
answer of f can be generated with K-norm mechanism as
follows.
Definition 3.3 (K-norm Mechanism [14]). Given any
function f and its sensitivity hull K, a mechanism is K-
norm mechanism if for any output z, the following holds:
Pr(z) =
1
Γ(d+ 1)Vol(K/)
exp (−||z− f(x∗)||K) (1)
where f(x∗) is the true answer, Γ() is Gamma function and
Vol() denotes volume.
In this paper, we only focus on Laplace mechanism and
K-norm mechanism for simplicity. Whereas our framework
is applicable to any differentially private perturbation mech-
anisms.
3.2 Blowfish Privacy
Unlike differential privacy which protects all neighboring
databases together, Blowfish privacy only protects the con-
nected secrets in its policy graph. Below we only show the
definition of Blowfish neighbors. Then Blowfish privacy can
be obtained by replacing the neighboring databases x1 and
x2 in Definition 3.1 with the following D1 and D2.
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Figure 4: (left) a Markov model with transition probabilities;
(right) its measurement query in Example 3.2.
Definition 3.4 (Blowfish Neighbors [13]). Given a
graph G and a set of constraints C, two databases D1 and
D2 are neighbors if they satisfy the constraint C, and
• (Unbounded Blowfish) D2 can be obtained by adding
a tuple to or removing a tuple from D1 if the tuple
(secret) is connected to a “null” node in G.
• (Bounded Blowfish) D1 and D2 only differ one tuple,
whose values in D1 and D2 are connected in G.
We can see that unbounded Blowfish protects the existence
of secrets, and bounded Blowfish protects the edges (con-
nected nodes) in the graph.
3.3 Hidden Markov Model
We denote the domain of states by S, S = {s1, s2, · · · , sN}
where each si is a unit vector with the ith element being
1 and other N − 1 elements being 0. We denote s∗ the
true state at each timestamp. For privacy protection, s∗ is
unobservable to (hidden from) any adversaries. Thus it is
an HMM. At timestamp t, we use a vector pt ∈ [0, 1]1×N to
denote the probability distribution of true state. Formally,
pt[i] = Pr(s
∗
t = si)
where pt[i] is the ith element in pt and si ∈ S.
Example 3.1 (Running Example). The example in Fig-
ure 3a is described by a random-walk Markov model in Figure
4 (left) where each state denotes a location on the map, if
the true state at timestamp t is s1, then s
∗
t = s1 =[1 0 0 0
0 0], pt =[1 0 0 0 0 0].
Transition Probabilities. We use matrix M ∈ [0, 1]N×N
to denote the transition probabilities with mij being the
probability of moving from state i to state j. Given proba-
bility vector pt−1, the probability at timestamp t becomes
pt = pt−1M.
We will focus on first-order time-homogeneous Markov
model in this paper with the understanding that our method
can also be extended to high-order or time-heterogeneous
Markov model.
Measurement Query. At each timestamp, a measure-
ment query f : S → Rd about current state is evaluated.
We denote the space containing all possible outputs of f by
measurement space.
Example 3.2 (Measurement Query). Let f : S →
R2 be two quantities about the true state in Figure 4:
f1 : temperatue of current state
f2 : noise level of current state
Then f can be expressed as f(s) =
[
1 2 3 0 4 1
0 1 0 1 2 2
]
sT
where each column corresponds the answer of a state, e.g.
f(s1) = [1, 0]
T , f(s2) = [2, 1]
T . Above answer can be de-
noted in measurement space, as in Figure 4 (right).
Emission Probabilities. Emission probabilities Pr(zt|s∗t )
denote the distribution of the observed variable zt. In DPHMM,
we design a private data release mechanism to answer the
query f with particular emission probabilities, which is the
only difference between DPHMM and standard HMM.
Inference and Evolution. At timestamp t, we use p−t
and p+t to denote the prior and posterior probabilities of an
adversary about current state before and after observing zt
respectively. The prior probability can be derived by the
(posterior) probability at previous timestamp t− 1 and the
Markov transition matrix as p−t = p
+
t−1M. The posterior
probability can be computed using Bayesian inference as
follows. For each state si:
p+t [i] = Pr(s
∗
t = si|zt) = Pr(zt|s
∗
t = si)p
−
t [i]∑
j
Pr(zt|s∗t = sj)p−t [j]
(2)
The inference of the true state at any timestamp can
be efficiently computed by the forward-backward algorithm,
which is also incorporated in our data release mechanism.
Other standard HMM algorithms can also be directly used
in DPHMM.
3.4 Problem Statement
Given an initial state (or probability) and a Markov model,
our problem is to answer a measurement query f : S → Rd
at each timestamp under the HMM assumptions. First, the
Markov model can be known to any adversaries. Second,
all the previously released answers (observable) can be ac-
cessed by adversaries to make inference about the true state.
Third, the data release mechanism is transparent to adver-
saries. The released answer zt should have the following
properties:
(1) it guarantees a privacy notion to protect the true state;
(2) it minimizes the error, measured by the `2 distance
between the released answer and the true answer f(s∗):
Error =
√
E||zt − f(s∗t )||22 (3)
(3) the privacy-utility trade-off can be customized for var-
ious privacy requirements.
Learning the Markov Model. A Markov model can be
learned from publicly available data or perturbed personal
data using standard methods, such as EM algorithm. Even
if an adversary can obtain such a model, we still need to pro-
tect the true state. In the DPHMM, we assume the Markov
model has been learned, and is also known to any adver-
saries.
Incomplete Model. Depending on the power of adver-
saries, an incomplete (inaccurate) Markov model can be used
by adversaries. In this case, the privacy is still guaranteed
while the inference result may be downgraded for the adver-
sary (Appendix 11.6).
4. PRIVACY DEFINITION
To derive the meaning of DPHMM, we extend Blowfish
privacy from [16, 13]. Related privacy notions are also dis-
cussed in this section.
4.1 Probabilistic Constraint
A main difference between Blowfish framework and our
framework is the constraint type. In Blowfish framework,
the constraints are deterministic, which leads to the NP-
hard complexity [16]. While in Markov model, the con-
straints are probabilistic. It means the probabilities of states
can be known to adversaries. At any timestamp t, the prior
probability p−t can be derived as
p−t [i] = Pr(s
∗
t = si|zt−1, · · · , z1)
Clearly, with p−t the states can be divided into two sets:
p−t = 0 and p
−
t > 0. Such probabilistic constraints result in
the following consequences.
• For the non-existing states (p−t [i] = 0), the unbounded
Blowfish privacy is meaningless. For example, if an
adversary knows “Bob does not have cancer”, it is not
necessary to pretend“Bob might have cancer”any more.
• For the possible states (p−t [i] > 0), unbounded Blow-
fish becomes bounded Blowfish privacy automatically,
explained as follows. In the definition of unbounded
Blowfish, the neighbors mean si exists or not. When
si does not exist, there has to exist another state
1.
Hence it becomes bounded Blowfish neighbors. This is
different from traditional Blowfish, in which a database
without any secret is still valid.
• Bounded Blowfish privacy only holds for the possible
states because all edges connecting the non-existing
states disappear in the policy graph.
Without ambiguity, we define the constraint of Markov
model as the set of states with p−t > 0.
Definition 4.1 (Constraint). Let p−t be the prior prob-
ability at timestamp t. Constraint Ct consists of all states
satisfying the constraint p−t [i] > 0.
Ct := {si|p−t [i] > 0, ∀si ∈ S}
In conclusion, we focus on the bounded Blowfish, which
means a state is mixed with other states in the graph, under
the constraint Ct.
4.2 Policy Graph
Policy Graph without Constraint. We first study the
problem in the whole domain S without any constraint.
Given the true state s∗ at a timestamp, a user may prefer
to hide s∗ in a group of candidate states, denoted by N (s∗)
as neighbors of s∗ where N (s∗) ⊆ S. Intuitively, the more
neighbors a state has, the more privately it is protected. For
simplicity, we assume si ∈ N (si) for all states si because it
is straightforward that si is hidden in its neighbor set N (si).
We can represent the privacy policy by a undirected graph
where a node represents a state and an edge connects an
indistinguishable pair of states.
Definition 4.2 (Policy). A policy is an undirected graph
G = (S, E) where S denotes all states (nodes) and E repre-
sents indistinguishability (edges) between states.
1It means the “null” node is invalid in Markov modoel.
(a) Gcplt (b) Gcateg (c) Gutil
s4
s2 s3s1
s5 s6
(d) Gtrs
Figure 5: Examples of policy graphs without constraint. (a):
complete protection; (b): categorical protection; (c): utility ori-
ented policy; (d): transition protection for Example 3.1.
Definition 4.3 (Neighbors). Let s be a state in S.
The neighbors of s, denoted by N (s), is the set of nodes
connected with s by an edge, including s itself.
N (s) := {s} ∪ {s′|ss′ ∈ E , s′ ∈ S}
To better adjust utility and privacy for any particular ap-
plications, how to design policy graph is not a trivial task.
Below we present a few examples of policy graphs, some
of which are from database context [16]. In DPHMM, we
assume a policy graph is given.
• Complete protection. To thoroughly protect a sensitive
state, we can connect it with all other states. In this way
all states are connected and it forms a complete graph, as
shown in Figure 5a. However, with higher privacy level
comes less utility. Such policy may result in useless out-
put.
Gcplt := {G|ss′ ∈ E , ∀s, s′ ∈ S}
• Categorical protection. A common method to balance
privacy and utility is to partition (or cluster) states into
categories. Then every state only needs to be protected
in its category. If in a category all states are connected,
then the graph becomes disjoint cliques. Figure 5b shows
such an example.
Gcateg := {G|G = G1 +G2 + · · ·+Gq, ∀i, j, Gi ∩Gj = ∅}
• Utility oriented policy. To improve utility, we may con-
sider the policy in the measurement space of query f . Fig-
ure 5c shows an example where nodes are only connected
if their answers are within r distance (`2 distance in this
example).
Gutil := {G|ss′ ∈ E iff dist(f(s), f(s′)) ≤ r, ∀s, s′ ∈ S}
where dist() is a distance function in measurement space.
• One-step transition protection. To protect a one-step
transition si → sj , we can require all pairs of states sj
and sk to be indistinguishable if they can be transited
from the same previous state si. For example, if transi-
tion probabilities are given in Example 3.1, then Gtrs can
be derived as Figure 5d by the following equation.
Gtrs := {G|sjsk ∈ E iff mij > 0 and mik > 0, ∀i, j, k}
Note that with Gtrs even if s
∗
t were exposed, s
∗
t+1 would
still be protected. Hence Gtrs provides strong privacy
guarantee.
Policy Graph with Constraint. With the constraint Ct
(Definition 4.1), the policy graph G has to be built on Ct at
(a) Gcplt ∩ C1 (b) Gcateg ∩C1 (c) Gutil ∩ C1
s4
s2 s3s1
s5 s6
(d) Gtrs ∩ C2
Figure 6: Policy graphs of Figure 5 with constraints C1 and C2,
denoted by the black points in the graphs.
each timestamp t. Then the policy graph becomes a sub-
graph with the nodes in Ct and the residual edges in G,
denoted by constrained policy graph G ∩ Ct. It is intuitive
that with different Ct graphs may be different over time.
Example 4.1 (Constrained Policy Graph). Figure
6 shows the policy graphs of Figure 5 with the constraint sets.
The black points indicate the constraint sets. The gray points
and their edges are removed from the original graph.
4.3 DPHMM
With policy graph G and any constraint Ct, {,G, Ct}-
DPHMM can be defined as follows with the intuition that
at any timestamp the true state cannot be distinguished
from its remaining “neighbors” under the constraint.
Definition 4.4 ({,G, Ct}-DPHMM). Let G be the pol-
icy graph, Ct be the constraint at timestamp t. An {,G, Ct}-
DPHMM algorithm A() generates an output zt such that for
any zt and any state sj ∈ Ct, the following condition is sat-
isfied:{ ∀sk ∈ N (sj) ∩ Ct, if sj is connected to sk in G ∩ Ct;
∃sk ∈ Ct, if sj is disconnected in G ∩ Ct;
e− ≤ Pr(A(sj) = zt)
Pr(A(sk) = zt) ≤ e
 (4)
In above definition, if sj is connected with any sk in Ct, then
sj and sk are indistinguishable by Equation (4); However,
if sj is disconnected, sj may be exposed
2. To protect sj
in this case, we have to connect sj to another node sk in Ct
(such new graph is called protectable graph in Section 5.2)
to form a new edge of indistinguishability between sj and
sk. The user has the choice to specify which sk to use to
protect sj
3. We also discuss how to find the optimal sk in
Section 6.1.
4.4 Comparison with Other Definitions
Among the variant definitions of differential privacy [18,
19, 16, 27] we briefly compare some closely related defini-
tions as follows.
δ-Location Set based Differential Privacy. [27] defined
differential privacy on a subset of possible states (locations)
derived from Markov model. The indistinguishability is en-
sured among any two locations in the δ-location set, which
2 The exposure consists of two scenarios: (1) an adversary
knows sj is the true state. (2) an adversary knows sj is not
the true state.
3We do not hide the policy information (e.g. sj and sk
are connected). DPHMM ensures that an adversary cannot
distinguish whether sj or sk is the true state.
can be viewed as a new constraint. Thus it is a special case
of DPHMM with complete graph.
Theorem 4.1. δ-location set based -differential privacy
[27] is equivalent to {,Gcplt, C′t}-DPHMM where Gcplt is a
complete graph and C′t = min{si|
∑
si
p−t [i] ≥ 1− δ}.
Blowfish Framework. There are three differences between
DPHMM and Blowfish framework. (1) The constraints in
Blowfish are deterministic; while constraints in Markov model
are probabilistic. (2) The graph in Blowfish is static; while
in Markov model the graph can be reduced. When there
are disconnected nodes in the reduced graph, privacy risk
needs to be tackled. (3) We quantify the privacy guarantee
of Blowfish in terms of differential privacy (Section 5.3).
Theorem 4.2. {,G, Ct}-DPHMM is equivalent to {, {S,
Gt, Ct}}-Blowfish privacy where S is the domain of states in
a Markov model, Gt is the set of graphs satisfying the con-
dition in DPHMM and Ct is the constraint.
5. PRIVACY RISK
Given a constrained policy graph G ∩ Ct, when a node si
is disconnected (without neighbors), one may conclude that
si will be disclosed. However, we show that this may not be
the case for Laplace mechanism or K-norm mechanism. The
reason is that the perturbation is based on the sensitivity of
a query, and the sensitivity may implicitly protect si with
other nodes. In this section, we formalize the intuition, and
define sensitivity hull and degree of protection (DoP) based
on the constrained policy graph to analyze the privacy risk.
We also analyze the overall protection of Blowfish privacy
with the sensitivity hull.
5.1 Sensitivity Hull
It has been shown that the standard `1-norm sensitivity
(in Definition 3.2) exaggerates the sensitivity of differential
privacy [27]. To capture the real sensitivity, we define sensi-
tivity hull of graph G and query f using convex hull, denoted
by Conv(). Intuitively, it measures the “maximum” differ-
ences of the query results on each pair of connected states
(edges in the graph).
Definition 5.1 (Sensitivity Hull). Given a graph G
= (S, E), the sensitivity hull of a query f is the convex hull
of ∆f where ∆f is the set of f(sj)−f(sk) for any connected
nodes sj and sk in G.
K(G, f) = Conv (∆f)
∆f = ∪
sjsk∈E
(f(sj)− f(sk))
Without ambiguity, ∆f can also be denoted by a matrix
in Rd×2m where each column is a point of f(sj)− f(sk) and
m = |E| is the number of edges in G. We show an example
as follows.
Example 5.1 (Sensitivity Hull). Given the query in
Example 3.2 and the graph in Figure 3b, Figure 7a shows
the policy graph without constraint in measurement space.
The `1-norm sensitivity (Definition 5.1 in [16]) is 5 because
||f(s4)− f(s5)||1 = 5. The dashed lines and solid lines show
the `1-norm sensitivity and sensitivity hull with the follow-
ing ∆f in Figure 7b respectively. Each column in ∆f de-
notes the query difference of two states, e.g., the first column
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Figure 7: Sensitivity hull without constraint. (a): the policy
graph of Figure 3 in measurement space; (b): the `1-norm sensi-
tivity (dashed lines) and the sensitivity hull K (solid lines).
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Figure 8: (left) constrained policy graph; (right) the query re-
sults in measurement space.
(−1, 1)T is f(s2)− f(s3).
∆f =
[ −1 1 −4 4 −1 1 3 −3
1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 0 0
]
Computation. The computation of sensitivity hull in-
volves two steps, ∆f and Conv(), withO(m2) andO(mlog(m)
+ mbd/2c) [3] complexity respectively, where m = |E| is the
number of edges in G, if the answer of f is given. Therefore,
the overall complexity is O(m2) for d ≤ 4 and O(mbd/2c) for
d > 4. We skip the computation details because Conv() has
been well studied in computational geometry.
Discussion. As shown in Figure 7b, `1-norm sensitivity
is bigger than sensitivity hull. Following this, we can fur-
ther prove that Laplace mechanism is a special case of K-
norm mechanism and provides no better utility than K-
norm mechanism. Thus we use K-norm mechanism as a
unifying mechanism in the following analysis of this paper.
Theorem 5.1. Laplace mechanism is a special case of K-
norm mechanism when K = K3Sf where K3Sf is the cross
polytope {x ∈ Rd : ||x||1 ≤ Sf} and Sf is the `1-norm sensi-
tivity of f .
Corollary 5.1. Laplace mechanism provides no better
utility than K-norm mechanism because K3Sf always con-
tains sensitivity hull K.
5.2 Privacy Risk
Under constraint, connectivity of policy graph is destruc-
ted. In the following example, we show that directly using
existing data release methods may lead to exposure of dis-
connected nodes.
Example 5.2 (Information Exposure). Given the query
in Example 3.2 and the graph in Figure 3b, assume at a
timestamp t, the constraint set Ct = {s2, s3, s5}. Then the
constrained graph is shown in Figure 8 (left). We use ex-
isting mechanisms, including Laplace based mechanisms and
K-norm based mechanisms, to answer the query in Example
3.2.
Laplace based Mechanisms. The `1-norm sensitivity
Sf = 2. W.l.o.g., assume the released answer z = f(s5).
Then for a Laplace mechanism A(), Pr(A(s5)=f(s5))
Pr(A(s3)=f(s5)) = e
3
2
 >
e 4, Pr(A(s5)=f(s5))
Pr(A(s2)=f(s5)) = e
3
2
 > e . Hence s5 is distinct from
s2 and s3. Consequently, if f(s5) is far from f(s2) and
f(s3), then s5 will be exposed.
K-norm based Mechanisms. Sensitivity hull of the query
f is Conv(f(s2)− f(s3), f(s3)− f(s2)) where Conv() is the
function of deriving convex hull. For a K-norm based mech-
anism A(), it means A(s2) and A(s3) are on the line of
f(s2)f(s3) (dashed line through f(s2) and f(s3) in Figure 8
(right)); A(s5) is on the dashed line through f(s5) in Figure
8 (right). Again we assume the released result z = f(s5).
Then Pr(A(s3) = f(s5)) = 0. Clearly, any z not on the line
of f(s2)f(s3) leads to complete exposure of s5.
Intuitively, given a disconnected node si in the constrained
set Ct, if there exists another node sj ∈ Ct such that the dif-
ference f(si) − f(sj) is contained in the sensitivity hull K,
then si is protected by sj . Otherwise, if no such node sj
exists, then si is exposed. Therefore, privacy risk can be
measured by sensitivity hull K as follows. If there is no sj
such that f(sj) ∈ f(si) + K, then si is exposed, meaning
that Equation (4) will not hold. To capture such geomet-
ric meaning (i.e., f(sj) − f(si) ∈ K), we define degree of
protection.
Definition 5.2 (DoP). At any timestamp t, the de-
gree of protection (DoP) of a state si is the number of states
contained in f(si) +Kt where Kt is the sensitivity hull.
DoP(si,Kt) = |{sj |f(sj) ∈ f(si) +Kt, sj ∈ Ct}|
Because f(si) is always in f(si) + K, DoP(si,K) ≥ 1 for
all si ∈ Ct. Note that not all disconnected nodes are ex-
posed. For example, in Figure 9a, s2 is disconnected under
constraint Ct = {s2, s4, s5, s6}. However, DoP(s2) = 3 since
f(s2) +K contains f(s4) and f(s5).
If all the nodes of a graph have DoP > 1, we say it is pro-
tectable. Note that a complete graph is always protectable
because every two nodes are connected.
Definition 5.3 (Protectable Graph). A graph G is
protectable if all its nodes have DoP > 1.
Theorem 5.2 (Exposure Condition). With Laplace
mechanism or K-norm based mechanisms, a graph G cannot
satisfy the DPHMM condition (Definition 4.4) iff G is not
protectable.
Computation. The computation of protectability (i.e. DoP)
is to check the number of f(sj) inside a convex body f(si)+
K for all sj ∈ Ct. Because the problem of checking whether
a point is a convex body has been well studied in computa-
tional geometry, we skip the discussion of details.
4Let n˜ ∈ R2 be 2 i.i.d Laplace noises with mean 0 and vari-
ance 1. Then Lap(Sf/) =
Sf

n˜ is the Laplace noises added
to the query. Pr(A(s5)=f(s5))
Pr(A(s3)=f(s5)) =
Pr(f(s5)+Lap(2/)=f(s5))
Pr(f(s3)+Lap(2/)=f(s5))
=
Pr(n˜= 
2
[0,0]T )
Pr(n˜= 
2
[1,2]T )
= exp( 
2
(||[1, 2]T ||1 − ||[0, 0]T ||1)) = exp( 32 ).
5.3 Blowfish Analysis
We now use the technique of sensitivity hull to analyze
the protection of Blowfish privacy.
Example 5.3 (Information Exposure). Given the ta-
ble T in Figure 2a and the graph in Figure 2b, let f be a
two-dimensional query:
f1 : select count(*) from T where disease=“cancer”
f2 : select count(*) from T where disease=“diabetes”
The `1-norm sensitivity Sf = 2. By Definition 5.1, ∆f =[
1 −1 −1 1
0 1 0 −1
]T
. Then the sensitivity hull can be de-
rived. Assume {,G}-Blowfish privacy is preserved where G
is the graph in Figure 2b. Then secret s5 is protected with
both Laplace mechanism and K-norm mechanism; while se-
cret s6 is protected only by Laplace mechanism, not by K-
norm mechanism. It can be proven that with K-norm mech-
anism the unbounded differential privacies for the existences
of {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} are {, 0, , 2, , 2} respectively (e.g.
Pr(A(D∪s6)=z)
Pr(A(D)=z) ≤ e2). Thus it is 2-unbounded-DP in total.
This also illustrates why we need to re-design a new optimal
graph with less privacy loss in Section 6.1. Note that (1) the
original bounded Blowfish privacy (i.e. the graph in Figure
2b) does not protect s6 in the first place. Hence the original
Blowfish privacy still holds; (2) although s4 is connected with
s3, the existence of s4 is also at risk (2-DP); (3) although
s6 is not connected with s4, it is indistinguishable with s4 by
default.
Formally, we summarize the protection of Blowfish as fol-
lows. (1) Bounded Blowfish and unbounded Blowfish inter-
fere with each other, e.g., bounded Blowfish can ensure or
violate unbounded Blowfish privacy and vice versa. (2) For
various queries, the protection of Blowfish differs. (3) For
various data release mechanisms, the protection of Blowfish
differs.
Quantifying Blowfish. We quantify the overall protection
of Blowfish as follows. First, it is intuitive that bounded
Blowfish is weaker than (or equal to) bounded DP, and
unbounded Blowfish is also weaker than (or equal to) un-
bounded DP. For lack of space, below we quantify the protec-
tion of bounded Blowfish in terms of unbounded DP with K-
norm mechanism. It can be easily extended to other cases.
Definition 5.4 ({,G, C}-ConstrainedDP). Let G =
(S, E) be the policy graph in Blowfish privacy, and C be the
instances satisfying the constraint in either Markov model
or database context. A randomized mechanism A() satisfies
{,G, C}-constrained differential privacy if for any output z,
one of the following condition holds:
(1). in Markov model,
Pr(A(sj)=z)
Pr(A(sk)=z) ≤ e
,∀sj , sk ∈ C;
(2). in database context, Pr(A(D1)=z)
Pr(A(D2)=z) ≤ e
, ∀D1, D2,∈ C, D1
can be obtained by adding si to or removing si from D2, si ∈ S.
Note that in Markov model, above definition is actually
bounded DP because unbound DP becomes bounded DP
by nature (Section 4.1).
Theorem 5.3 (Blowfish Protection). Let G be the
policy graph, and C be the instances satisfying the constraint
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Figure 9: (a): if Ct = {s2, s4, s5, s6}, then s2 is also protected because f(s4) ∈ f(s2) + K and f(s5) ∈ f(s2) + K; (b): if Ct =
{s3, s4, s5, s6}, then s3 is exposed; (c): adding s3s4 to graph; (d): adding s3s6 to graph; (e): adding s3s5 to graph;
in Blowfish privacy. With K-norm mechanism, if {, {S, G, C}}-
Blowfish privacy holds, then it satisfies
(1).
{(
max
∀sj ,sk∈C
||f(sj)− f(sk)||K
)
,G, C
}
-constrainedDP
in Markov model;
(2).
{(
max
∀si∈C
||f(si)||K
)
,G, C
}
-constrainedDP in database
context,
where K is the sensitivity hull of query f .
6. DATA RELEASE MECHANISM
If privacy risk is detected, we build a protectable graph
as a supergraph of existing graph 5. In this section, we first
formulate the problem of building a minimum protectable
graph with lowest error bound. Next we show that this
problem is #P-hard, and propose a fast greedy algorithm.
Then we present the data release mechanism.
6.1 Minimum Protectable Graph
It is clear that a protectable graph satisfies the DPHMM
condition in Definition 4.4. Therefore, when information
is exposed, we need to build a protectable graph by re-
connecting the disconnected nodes so that they have DoP >
1. Next we formulate the problem of building a minimum
protectable graph and investigate its computational com-
plexity, then propose a greedy algorithm to this end.
Minimum Protectable Graph. Because the error bound
of differential privacy is determined by the volume of sen-
sitivity hull K(Gt) [14] where Gt is the graph under con-
straint at timestamp t, the optimal graph should have the
minimum volume of K(Gt) for best utility. We define the
optimal graph as follows.
Given the policy graph G and the constraint set Ct at
timestamp t, the optimal graph Ĝt is a graph containing
G ∩ Ct with minimum volume K(Ĝt) under the DPHMM
condition (Definition 4.4):
Ĝt = argmin
G
Vol(K(G)) (5)
5On the other hand, since the policy graph is customizable
to users, the protectable graph can also be created by users.
In this case, it is not necessary to derive another minimum
protectable graph again.
subject to: (G ∩ Ct) ⊆ Ĝt
Ĝt satisfies the DPHMM condition
Example 6.1 (Minimum Protectable Graph). Given
the query in Example 3.2 and the graph in Figure 3b, Fig-
ure 9b shows the graph under constraint Ct = {s3, s4, s5, s6}.
Then s3 is exposed because f(s3)+K contains no other node.
To satisfy the DPHMM condition, we need to connect s3 to
another node in Ct, i.e. s4, s5 or s6.
If s3 is connected to s4, then Figure 9c shows the new
graph and its sensitivity hull. By adding two new edges
{f(s3) − f(s4), f(s4) − f(s3)} to ∆f , the shaded areas are
attached to the sensitivity hull. Similarly, Figures 9d and 9e
show the new sensitivity hulls when s3 is connected to s6 and
s5 respectively. Because the smallest Area(K) is in Figure
9c, the optimal graph Ĝt is G ∩ Ct ∪ s3s4.
Complexity. We can see that to derive the optimal graph,
minimum volume Vol(K) should be computed. For any
query f : S → Rd, K is a polytope in Rd. However, the
volume computation of polytope is #P-hard [9]. Thus it
follows that the computation of minimum volume is no easier
than #P-hard 6.
Theorem 6.1. The problem of minimum protectable graph
in Equation (5) is #P-hard.
Greedy Algorithm. Due to the computational complex-
ity, we propose a greedy algorithm similar to minimum span-
ning tree. The idea is to connect each disconnected node to
its nearest (in measurement space) node. For other theo-
retical algorithms of volume computation with polynomial
time bound, please see [26]. Algorithm 1 shows the greedy
algorithm, which takes O(N2) time where N = |V| is the
number of nodes.
6.2 Data Release Mechanism
The data release mechanism is shown in Algorithm 2. At
each timestamp t, we compute the prior probability vector
6In low-dimensional space, it is still possible to design fast
algorithms. For example, minimum protectable graph can
be derived in O(nm3) time in 2-dimensional space where
m = |E| is the number of edges and n is the number of
exposed nodes.
Algorithm 1 Protectable Graph
Require: G, Ct, f
1: Gt ← G ∩ Ct;
2: for all exposed node si ∈ Ct do
3: sj ← argmin
s∈Ct
||f(s)− f(si)||2;
4: Gt ← Gt ∪ sisj ; . connect to nearest node
5: end for
6: return protectable graph Gt;
p−t . Under the constraint Ct, the graph G becomes a sub-
graph G ∩ Ct. To satisfy the DPHMM condition, we derive
a protectable graph Gt by Algorithm 1. Next a differentially
private mechanism can be adopted to release a perturbed an-
swer zt. Then the released zt will also be used to update the
posterior probability p+t (in the equation below) by Equa-
tion (2), which subsequently will be used to compute the
prior probability for the next timestamp t+ 1.
p+t [i] = Pr(s
∗
t = si|zt, zt−1, · · · , z1)
Algorithm 2 Data Release Mechanism
Require: t, G, f , M, p
+
t−1, s
∗
t
1: p−t ← p+t−1M; . Markov transition
2: Ct ← {si|p−t [i] > 0}; . constraint
3: Gt ← Algorithm 1(G, Ct, f); . protectable graph Gt
4: zt ← K-norm based mechanism(f(s∗t ), K(Gt));
5: Derive p+t by Equation (2); . inference
. go to next timestamp
6: return Algorithm 2(t+1, G, f , M, p
+
t , s
∗
t+1);
Note that in line 4 zt can be released by either Laplace
mechanism or K-norm mechanism. For simplicity, we use
K-norm mechanism as a unifying mechanism (Theorem 5.1).
Theorem 6.2. Given policy graph G and query f , Algo-
rithm 2 satisfies {,G, Ct}-DPHMM at any timestamp.
Theorem 6.3. Given policy graph G and query f , at any
timestamp t, Algorithm 2 satisfies{(
max
∀sj ,sk∈Ct
||f(sj)− f(sk)||Kt
)
,G, Ct
}
-constrainedDP (Def-
inition 5.4) where Ct is the constraint, Kt is the sensitivity
hull of query f and protectable graph Gt.
7. PRIVACY COMPOSITION
In some cases, multiple queries need to be answered. Thus
we analyze the privacy composition for multiple data re-
leases. Note that the parallel composition [21] is not appli-
cable because there is only one state in Markov model.
Single-Time Multiple-Queries. At one timestamp, it
is possible that many queries should be answered. Then the
privacy cost  composes for all queries.
Theorem 7.1. At timestamp t, an {,G, Ct}-DPHMM mech-
anism released multiple answers z1, z2, · · · , zn for queries
f1, f2, · · · , fn with 1, 2, · · · , n, then it satisfies {∑ni=1 i, G, Ct}-
DPHMM and
{
n∑
i=1
(
max
∀sj ,sk∈Ct
||f(sj)− f(sk)||Ki
)
i, G, Ct
}
-
constrainedDP where Ki denotes the sensitivity hull of fi.
Multiple-Time Single-Query. If a query was answered
over multiple timestamps, then the privacy protection has
to be enforced on the sequence. Under the probabilistic
constraint, we define differentially private sequence with all
possible sequences.
Definition 7.1. A constraint set of sequences Q = {Q1,
Q2, · · · ,Qn} is a set of n possible sequences with Pr(Qi) > 0
for all Qi ∈ St, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Definition 7.2 ({,Q}-ConstrainedDPS). During times-
tamps 1, 2, · · · , t in an HMM, a randomized mechanism A()
generates {,Q}-ConstrainedDPS if for any output sequence
z1, z2, · · · , zt and any possible sequences Qj and Qk in Q,
the following holds
Pr
(A(Qj) = (z1, z2, · · · , zt))
Pr (A(Qk) = (z1, z2, · · · , zt))
≤ e
Theorem 7.2. During timestamps i = 1, 2, · · · , t in an
{i, G, Ci}-DPHMM with policy graph G and constraints Ci =
{Qj [i]|∀Qj ∈ Q}, the released sequence z1, z2, · · · , zt for a
query f satisfies
{
t∑
i=1
(
max
∀sj ,sk∈Ci
||f(sj)− f(sk)||Ki
)
i,Q
}
-
constrainedDPS where Ki denotes the sensitivity hull at
timestamp i.
Above compositions can be combined for the case of multiple-
time and multiple-queries data releases. This completes our
analysis of privacy composition over time.
8. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We report the experimental evaluation in this section.
All algorithms were implemented in Matlab on a PC with
2.4GHz CPU and 4GB memory.
Datasets. We used the following two datasets with similar
configurations in [27] for comparison purpose. The Markov
models were learned from the raw data. From each dataset,
20 sequences, each of which contains 100 timestamps, were
selected for our experiment. Then the average result is re-
ported.
• Geolife dataset. Geolife dataset [28] recorded a wide
range of users’ outdoor movements, represented by
a series of tuples containing latitude, longitude and
timestamp. We extracted all the trajectories within
the 3rd ring of Beijing to learn the Markov model,
with the map partitioned into cells of 0.34×0.34 km2.
• Gowalla dataset. Gowalla dataset [4] contains 6, 442, 890
check-in locations of 196, 586 users over 20 months. We
extracted all the check-ins in Los Angeles to train the
Markov model, with the map partitioned into cells of
0.89× 0.89 km2.
Mechanisms. For better utility, we used the planar isotropic
mechanism in [27] (with δ = 0.01) to release the locations of
users. We denote our privacy notion and [27] by DPMM and
DPLS 7 respectively. Because Laplace mechanism provides
no better utility than K-norm based mechanism, proved in
Corollary 5.1, we skipped the evaluation of Laplace mecha-
nism. The default value of  is 1 if not mentioned.
7Differential privacy on location set.
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Figure 10: Runtime.
Application. For location data, a common application is
to release the location coordinates. Thus we use the mea-
surement query f : S → R2 that returns a 2 × 1 vector of
longitude and latitude.
Two policy graphs were adopted in our experiments: utility-
oriented Gutil and privacy-oriented Gtrs, as defined in Sec-
tion 4.2.
• Gutil connects all nodes if their distances of locations
are less than r;
• Gtrs guarantees that even if the previous states were
completely exposed, privacy can still be protected in
the current timestamp.
Because of different customizations of the two graphs, we can
examine the different results of them. In Gutil, the default
values of r for GeoLife and Gowalla are 1(km) and 2(km)
respectively.
Metrics. We used the following metrics in our experiment.
• To measure the efficiency, the runtime of data release
method was evaluated.
• DoP represents the number of nodes that a node is
hidden in. Hence to reflect the privacy level of true
states, DoP of true states was computed.
• The utility of DPHMM was measured by Error =
||zt−f(s∗t )||2 where zt is the released answer and f(s∗t )
is the true answer.
8.1 Runtime
Figure 10 shows the runtime report on the two datasets.
We can see that the runtime of DPHMM, either with Gutil
or Gtrs, is a little bit longer than DPLS. The reason is that
DPLS uses a tighter constraint than Ct, which in our set-
ting became numerous when Markov model converged to a
stationary distribution gradually. Then the computation of
sensitivity hull took more time with larger graph. It is also
worth noting that sensitivity hull converges with Ct. As time
evolves, the runtime also converges with Markov model to a
stable level.
8.2 Performance over Time
At each timestamp, the (smoothed) DoP and Error are
shown in Figure 11. As expected, Gtrs provides the strongest
protection of privacy, while Gutil has the lowest error on
both datasets. With Gtrs, the true state was protected in
a set of 100 and 70 possible states for the two datasets.
Provided such strong protection, the error also rises. With
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Figure 11: Performance over time.
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Figure 12: Impact of .
Gutil, the query error was smaller than DPLS yet the DoP
was even larger than DPLS. Therefore, we can infer that
customizable graph provides better trade-off between pri-
vacy and utility.
8.3 Impact of Parameters
We also measure the average performance over the 100
timestamps with different parameters.
Impact of . Figure 12 reports the impact of . From
Figures 12a and 12b, DoP stays the same with different 
because the size of Ct does not change with . Again we see
that Gtrs provides the largest DoP with little sacrifice of
utility, compared with DPLS. Figures 12c and 12d verifies
that the larger , the smaller Error, which is easy to under-
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Figure 13: Impact of different graphs of Gutil.
stand because  determines the shape of noise distribution.
Impact of r. To better understand the trade-off between
privacy and utility with different graphs, we also tested the
performance with different Gutil(r) where r is the distance
parameter in measurement space, as defined in Section 4.2 8.
Intuitively, with larger r comes stronger protection, which is
confirmed in Figures 13a and 13b. However, the Error of
DPHMM is still lower than DPLS in most results, although
it is expected that Error grows with bigger r. Therefore,
we can conclude that with different policy graph privacy and
utility can be better tuned in different scenarios.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we proposed DPHMM by embedding a dif-
ferentially private data release mechanism in hidden Markov
model. DPHMM guarantees that the true state in Markov
model at every timestamp is protected by a customizable
policy graph. Under the temporal correlations, the graph
may be reduced to subgraphs. Thus we studied the conse-
quential privacy risk by introducing the notion of protectable
graph based on the sensitivity hull and degree of protection.
To prevent information exposure we studied how to build an
optimal protectable graph based on the current graph. The
privacy guarantee of DPHMM has also been thoroughly in-
vestigated, by comparing it with other privacy notions and
studying the composition results over multiple queries and
timestamps.
DPHMM can be used in a variety of applications to release
private data for purposes like data mining or social studies.
Future works can also study how to efficiently design and im-
plement the policy graph for various privacy requirements.
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11. APPENDIX
11.1 Laplace Mechanism
From the view point of K-norm mechanism, we can prove
the following statements:
1. Laplace mechanism is a special case of K-norm mech-
anism.
2. Laplace mechanism is optimal in one-dimensional space.
3. The `1-norm sensitivity of Laplace mechanism contains
sensitivity hull. Therefore, Laplace mechanism is not
optimal in multidimensional space.
For standard Laplace mechanism, the answer for query
workload F ∈ Rd×N [7] is
z = Fx∗ +
SF

n˜
where SF is the `1-norm sensitivity of F and n˜ ∈ Rd are i.i.d
variables from standard Laplace distribution with mean 0
and variance 1.
Lemma 11.1. Let fn˜(n˜) be the joint distribution of n˜ ∈
Rd where n˜1, n˜2, · · · , n˜d are from i.i.d standard Laplace dis-
tribution. Then
fn˜(n˜) =
1
2d
exp (−||n˜||1)
Proof. For a scalar variable n˜ from standard Laplace dis-
tribution, fn˜(n˜) =
1
2
exp(−|n˜|). Then for n˜ = [n˜1, n˜2, · · · , n˜d]T ,
fn˜(n˜ = [n˜1, n˜2, · · · , n˜d]T )
=
1
2
exp(−|n˜1|) · 1
2
exp(−|n˜2|) · · · · · 1
2
exp(−|n˜d|)
=
1
2d
exp (−||n˜||1)
Theorem 11.1. Let fz(z) be the probability distribution
of z from standard Laplace mechanism. Then
fz(z) =
d
2dSdF
exp
(
− 
SF
||z− Fx∗||1
)
Theorem 11.2. Let K3r be the cross polytope {x ∈ Rd :
||x||1 ≤ r}. Standard Laplace mechanism is a special case of
K-norm mechanism when K = K3SF .
Proof. In Equation (1), letK = K3SF . ThenVol(K3SF) =
2d
Γ(d+1)
SdF. The K
3
SF
-norm of any z ∈ Rd is ||z||1
SF
. Then we
can obtain
Pr(z) =
d
2dSdF
exp(− 
SF
||z− Fx∗||1)
From Theorem 5.1, Statement 1 is true because K = K3SF
in K-norm mechanism; Statement 2 is true because K is
isotropic (up to a constant) in one-dimensional space; State-
ment 3 is true because K3SF contains the sensitivity hull.
11.2 Details in Example 5.3
We explain the computation details in Example 5.3.
Example 11.1. W.l.o.g, for a database D we assume the
answer to the query in Example 5.3 is f(D) = [10, 20]T .
Then f(D ∪ s1) = [11, 20]T , f(D ∪ s2) = [10, 20]T , f(D ∪
s3) = [11, 20]
T , f(D ∪ s4) = [10, 21]T . Given the graph in
Figure 2b, Sf = 2 = ||f(D ∪ s3) − f(D ∪ s4)||1. Similarly,
∆f = ± [f(D ∪ s1)− f(D ∪ s2), f(D ∪ s3)− f(D ∪ s4)] =[
1 −1 −1 1
0 1 0 −1
]T
. The sensitivity hull K is shown in
Figure 14. For s5, f(D ∪ s5) = [11, 20]T . Because f(D ∪
s5) − f(D) = [1, 0]T , s5 is protected by K-norm mecha-
nism for [1, 0]T ∈ K. Because ||[1, 0]T ||1 = 1 < Sf , it
is protected by Laplace mechanism. For s6, f(D ∪ s6) −
f(D) = [0, 1]T . Thus s6 is protected by Laplace mechanism
since ||[0, 1]T ||1 = 1 < 2. Because [0, 1]T is not in K, it
is not protected by K-norm mechanism. W.l.o.g, assume
z = [10, 21]T . Let n˜ be the noise injected by K-norm mech-
anism. Pr(A(D∪s6)=z)
Pr(A(D)=z) =
Pr(f(D∪s6)+n˜=z)
Pr(f(D)+n˜=z)
= Pr(n˜=[0,0]
T )
Pr(n˜=[0,1]T )
=
exp(||[0, 1]T ||K − ||[0, 0]T ||K) = exp(2). Hence the un-
bounded DP for s6 is 2. Similarly, the unbounded DP for
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} are {, 0, , 2, , 2} respectively. Over-
all, it is 2-unbounded-DP.
-1-2
-2
2
2
`1-norm
K
-1
1
Figure 14: Sensitivity hull K in Example 5.3.
11.3 Minimum Protectable Graph in 2-Dimensional
Space
It is possible to design fast algorithms in low dimensional
space to derive the minimum protectable graph. We propose
a fast algorithm in 2-dimensional space.
In 2-dimensional space, it only takes O(mlog(m)) time
to find a convex hull where m = |E| is the number of edges.
Thus we can connect the disconnected node si to the rest (at
most 2m) nodes, generating at most 2m convex hulls. We
use
i=h∑
i=1,j=i+1
det(vi,vj) to derive the area of a convex hull
with clockwise nodes v1,v2, · · · ,vh where h is the number
of vertices and vh+1 = v1. By comparing the area of these
convex hulls, we can find the smallest area in O(nm3) time
where n is the number of exposed nodes.
Theorem 11.3. Algorithm 3 takes O(nm3) time where
m = |E| is the number of edges and n is the number of
exposed nodes.
11.4 Computing Degree of Protection
The computation of DoP is to check the number of f(sj)
inside a convex body f(si) + K for all sj ∈ Ct. The prob-
lem of checking whether a point is a convex body has been
Algorithm 3 2D Minimum Protectable Graph
Require: G, Ct, f : S → R2
1: Gt(V, E)← G ∩ Ct;
2: K ← K(Gt);
3: for all exposed node si ∈ V do
4: sk ← ∅;
5: minArea←∞;
6: for all other node sj ∈ V do
7: K ← K(Gt ∪ sisj); . O(m2)
8: Area =
i=h∑
i=1,j=i+1
det(vi,vj) where vh+1 = v1;
9: if Area < minArea then
10: sk ← sj ;
11: minArea = Area; . find minimum area
12: end if
13: end for
14: Gt ← Gt ∪ sisk
15: K ← K(Gt);
16: end for
17: return graph Gt(V, E);
well studied in computational geometry. Thus we skip the
discussion of details.
min
1
2
||∆f · x− v||22 (6)
subject to: 1 · x = 1
x  0
where x ∈ R2m is the unknown variable, m = |E| is the
number of edges in G, v = f(sj) − f(si), 1 is a 1 × 2m
vector of [1, 1, · · · , 1], x  0 means all elements in x ≥ 0. If
∆f · x = v then sj is contained in f(si) + K. Algorithm 4
summarizes the process.
Algorithm 4 Degree of Protection
Require: G, Ct f , disconnected node si ∈ G ∩ Ct
1: ∆f = ∪
sjsk∈E(G∩Ct)
(f(sj)− f(sk));
2: DoP(si)← 1;
3: for all sj ∈ Ct, sj 6= si do
4: v← f(sj)− f(si);
5: Solve x in Equation (6); . test v ∈ K
6: if ∆f · x == v then
7: DoP(si) + +; . not exposed
8: end if
9: end for
10: return DoP(si); . if DoP(si) = 1, exposed
11.5 Attacks on Local Differential Privacy
Why should we prevent the disclosure of unprotected nodes
in a graph? In Example 5.2, we can see that the states s2
and s3 are still indistinguishable. It only matters when the
true state is s5. Following this rationale, we can also define
local differential privacy (e.g. [23]) based on the true state.
Accordingly, this scarifies privacy for better utility.
Definition 11.1 (-LocalDP). At any timestamp t in
MM with policy graph G and true state s∗t , an output zt
generated by a randomized algorithm A is -differentially
private if for any zt and any states sj , sk ∈ N (s∗t ) ∩ Ct,
Pr(A(sj)=zt)
Pr(A(sk)=zt) ≤ e
holds.
Becasue a data release mechanism should be transparent
to adversaries, the sensitivity hull (or `1-norm sensitivity)
should also be public to adversaries. A concern of above
definition is that sensitivity hull should remain indistinguish-
able regardless of the true state in order to preserve privacy.
We defer such investigation to future works, with the un-
derstanding that the analysis in the rest of this paper also
applies to it.
The localDP in Definition 11.1 is vulnerable to attacks
using the knowledge of sensitivity hull. We use the following
example to demonstrate the attack.
o 21 3 4
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Figure 15: Attack on LocalDP.
Example 11.2. Continue with the running example. As-
sume the constraint is Ct = {s4, s5, s6}. Then we consider
the instance of true state. When s∗t = s4, K = Conv([−1,−1]T , [1, 1]T ).
The released answer zt will be on the line f(s4)f(s5); When
s∗t = s6, zt is on the line f(s6)f(s5). Then the following
inference can be made:
If zt ∈ f(s4)f(s6), then s∗t 6= s5;
If zt ∈ f(s6)f(s5), then s∗t 6= s4;
If zt /∈ f(s4)f(s6) ∩ zt /∈ f(s6)f(s5), then s∗t = s6;
From above example, we know that the true state can
be precisely figured out by attackers using the definition of
sensitivity hull. Because a differentially private mechanism
should be transparent to attackers, LocalDP leaks privacy.
Thus it is necessary to ensure that the sensitivity hulls re-
main indistinguishable for any true states.
11.6 Adversarial Knowledge
There might be a variety of adversaries with different
prior knowledge in reality. Thus we consider the adversar-
ial knowledge in this section. Similar to existing works [24,
27], we assume that the Markov model and the data release
mechanism, including the sensitivity hull K, is transpar-
ent to any adversaries, meaning adversaries know how the
query answers were released. If this assumption does not
hold, then adversarial knowledge can only be worse, leading
to less privacy disclosures.
We define constrained adversarial privacy as follows, with
a similar adversary-constraint CAt derived from the prior
knowledge pAt of any adversaries:
CAt := {si|pAt [i] > 0, ∀si ∈ S}
Definition 11.2 ({, CAt }-ConstrainedAP). For adver-
saries with knowledge CAt , a mechanism is -adversarially
private if for any output zt and any state si ∈ CAt , Pr(si|zt)Pr(si) ≤
e.
Theorem 11.4 ([27]). If Ct = CAt , G, {,G, Ct}-constrainedDP
(Definition 5.4) is equivalent to {,G, CAt }-constrainedAP
(Definition 11.2).
We discuss various adversarial knowledge as follows.
• Case I: CAt ⊂ Ct. When |CAt | = 1, the adversary has
already known the true state. Then no privacy can be
protected in this case. Otherwise, G∩CAt is a subgraph
of G ∩ Ct. Then {,G, CAt }-DPHMM still holds.
• Case II: Ct ⊂ CAt . Similar to the analysis in Section
5.2, Algorithm 2 (usingK-norm based mechanism) may
not satisfy {,G, CAt }-DPHMM if any node in CAt has
DoP = 1, derived from Kt(Gt) in Algorithm 2.
•
{(
max
∀si,sj∈CAt ∩Ct
||f(si)− f(sj)||Kt
)
, CAt ∩ Ct
}
-cons-
trainedAP holds in both cases. Hence{(
max
∀si,sj∈CAt ∩Ct
||f(si)− f(sj)||Kt
)
, CAt ∩ Ct
}
-cons-
trainedDP also holds by Theorem 11.4.
